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1Department of Psychology, “Babes¸-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, 2Department of Organisation Studies, Tilburg
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In a field study (148 participants organized in 38 groups) we tested the effect of group
synergy and one’s position in relation to the collaborative zone of proximal development
(CZPD) on the change of individual decision-making competencies. We used two parallel
sets of decision tasks reported in previous research to test rationality and we evaluated
individual decision-making competencies in the pre-group and post-group conditions as
well as group rationality (as an emergent group level phenomenon). We used multilevel
modeling to analyze the data and the results showed that members of synergetic groups
had a higher cognitive gain as compared to members of non-synergetic groups, while
highly rational members (members above the CZPD) had lower cognitive gains compared
to less rational group members (members situated below the CZPD). These insights
extend the literature on group-to-individual transfer of learning and have important
practical implications as they show that group dynamics influence the development of
individual decision-making competencies.
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Introduction
“. . . a group is an aggregate of organisms in which the existence of all is utilized for the satisfaction of some
needs of each” (Cattell et al., 1953, p. 332).
Modern organizations often appoint groups to make decisions with important organizational
or societal consequences and in spite of the increasing scholarly interest in decision-making
competencies we know relatively little about how group interactions change individual decision-
making competencies. Decision competencies reflect the (individual or group) capability of
consistently making choices aligned with a normative ideal (Parker and Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine
de Bruin et al., 2007; Baron, 2012; Curs¸eu and Schruijer, 2012a), a notion inspired from the
classic view on rationality (Shafir and LeBoeuf, 2002). As attempts to bolster individual decision
competencies by teaching about game theory and econometrics were unsuccessful (Rubinstein,
1999), an important question remains on how to train individual decision competencies. In this
paper, we aim to examine whether group-to-individual transfer of learning generated via specific
competence-based group configurations and synergetic interpersonal processes in groups can
improve individual decision-making competencies.
The current study builds on the group-to-individual learning transfer literature (Laughlin and
Sweeney, 1977; Olivera and Straus, 2004; Laughlin et al., 2008; Schultze et al., 2012) to argue that
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social and cognitive factors influence group-to-individual
learning transfer and in particular the development of individual
decision-making competencies. Groups are multi-level social
systems with cognitive and emotional emergent properties
(Barsade and Gibson, 1998; Curs¸eu, 2006; Woolley et al.,
2010; Hinsz, 2015). By interacting with each other in groups,
individual group members change their cognitive structures
and competencies and generate collective, group level cognitive
structures and competencies (Curs¸eu et al., 2007). This cognitive
co-evolution process (also labeled collective induction) is argued
to be the source of group cognition (Curs¸eu, 2006; Curs¸eu et al.,
2007; Hinsz, 2015) as well as of individual cognitive change and
development (Goos et al., 2002).
In line with the multi-level theory of groups (Klein and
Kozlowski, 2000; Kozlowski and Chao, 2012; Kozlowski et al.,
2013), two top-down group level factors are expected to influence
individual cognitions. We distinguish between compositional
and compilational factors because individuals may learn from
other group members (compositional effects) as well as from
the group as a whole (compilational effects) (Brodbeck and
Greitemeyer, 2000). First, compositional systemic properties
reflect the within group variability (or constellation) of individual
(cognitive) competencies and the focus lies on an individual’s
position in relation to other group members. In compositional
terms, the development of individual decision competencies
varies as a function of the individual’s distance from the other
group members. Second, compilational systemic properties
describe the system as a whole and transcend individual
(cognitive) competencies. Group level emergent decision
competencies may shape the competencies of the individual
group members. In order to capture such compilational effects,
we focus on group synergy and argue that the development of
individual decision competencies depends on the effectiveness
of the collective induction processes (that is, the extent to
which groups generate cognitive phenomena that transcend the
individual cognitions of their members).
Group-to-individual (G-I) Transfer of
Learning
G-I transfer of learning describes the extent to which individual
group members improve their specific knowledge, problem
solving, or decision-making competencies after engaging in
collaborative tasks (Laughlin and Sweeney, 1977). In the G-
I transfer literature, researchers typically compare subsequent
individual performance for participants who first performed
tasks (decision-making or problem solving) individually versus
in teams. For example, Schultze et al. (2012) performed two
studies in which they compared the performance of interacting
groups with the average (prior to group task) performance of
their individual members in quantitative judgment tasks. Their
results showed that groups’ superiority to individual performance
was solely attributable to individual cognitive gains following
group interactions.
As idea generation is essential in decision making (DelMissier
et al., 2015), we argue that interpersonal interactions in groups
create collaborative zones of proximal development that facilitate
the development of individual decision competencies. We posit
that through social learning processes less competent group
members can develop their decision competencies by interacting
with more rational group members. The position a member
has in the group in terms of rationality shapes the learning
potential of that group member (compositional effect). In
addition, effective collective induction processes generate group
level decision-making competencies that transcend individual
competencies, and individual group members benefit from these
emergent group level competencies (compilational effect). We
further elaborate on these two mechanisms for G-I transfer of
learning in subsequent sections.
Social Learning and Collaborative Zones of
Proximal Development
We draw on the concept of “zones of proximal development” to
explain social learning processes in groups. The notion of zones
of proximal development illustrates the distance between the
actual developmental level of a person and the level of potential
development as determined by collaboration with more capable
peers (Vygotsky, 1978). Goos et al. (2002) extended the concept
of zone of proximal development and argued that small groups
develop collaborative zones of proximal development (CZPD).
As such, the configuration of individual decision competencies
within a group creates potential CZPD. These potential CZPD
emerge around the average of individual competencies, as Goos
et al. (2002) argued that “there is learning potential in peer
groups where students have incomplete but relatively equal
expertise—each partner possessing some knowledge and skill but
requiring the others’ contribution in order to make progress”
(p. 195). Collaborative zones of proximal development are
therefore necessary in order for the small group to be effective
in helping individual members develop their decision-making
competencies.
In the compositional perspective, individual group members
learn from each other through vicarious observation and peer
learning effects. However, the effectiveness of social learning
processes among group members varies as a function of the
similarity of the knowledge repertoires held by those involved in
the learning process. In other words, individual group members
benefit differently from social learning processes depending
on their relative position in relation to the potential CZPD
and, in line with the complementary-task type model (Steiner,
1966), group members would benefit especially if they work
with partners of similar or higher competence (Laughlin et al.,
2008).
Small groups stimulate meta-cognitive activities and strategies
as individual group members engage in social comparisons
and develop their own insights into the cognitive processes
underlying the evaluation of alternatives in decision-making
(McNeese, 2000; Hinsz, 2015). These socially induced meta-
cognitive activities may lead to the improvement of individual
decision competencies following interpersonal interactions
in groups. Group members situated below the CZPD can
benefit from the CZPD created by other more competent
members. In line with Vygotski’s cognitive development
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theory, the collaborative zones of proximal development are
situated above the competence of the least rational group
member and represent a zone of potential development
for this individual (Chaiklin, 2003). Through social learning
processes the least rational group members will manage to
improve their rationality from an initial level to the level of
their potential. Through vicarious observation less competent
members copy the decision-making strategies displayed by more
competent members (Manz and Sims, 1981) and through peer
learning less competent members improve their knowledge
repertoires and cognitive skills by interacting with more
competent group members (Steiner, 1966; Davis and Luthans,
1980).
In the proximal condition, the differences in rationality
among the group members are rather low and individuals are
situated around the CZPD. That is, group members are situated
relatively close to each other and for this reason they create
an accessible source of development. Nevertheless, given that
rationality differences are not that high, we expect that the
potential for social learning is lower as compared to individuals
situated below the CZPD. Group members situated above the
CZPD are less likely to benefit from reciprocally exploring
each other’s reasoning and decision-making strategies (Steiner,
1966). In consensus-based decision-making, group members
situated above the CZPD could even experience a deterioration
of their decision-competencies. If group members have to agree
on joint evaluations, rational members may be misled by the
insights shared by the less rational members. On the basis
of these theoretical arguments, we expect that the cognitive
benefits of collective decision-making efforts for individual group
members (i.e., G-I transfer of learning) are dependent on an
individual’s position in relation to the collaborative zones of
proximal development. More specifically, we argue that learning
potential varies as a function of ones’ position in relation to the
CZPD.
Hypothesis 1: One’s relative position in relation to the CZPD
influences the development of decision competencies in such a
way that group members with lower rationality than the rest of
the group members have a higher cognitive gain compared to
group members having a higher rationality than the rest of the
group.
Collective Induction and Group Synergy
Collective induction is a group cognitive process by which
members’ individual responses or preferences are combined
and recombined through social interaction in such a way that
the group as a whole generates solutions and alternatives that
could not have been generated through a simple aggregation
of individual responses. In other words, collective induction is
a form of generative learning (McNeese, 2000) through which
new knowledge structures (solutions, decisions, judgments)
emerge from the cognitive combinatorial process that
unfolds during social interactions. The results of collective
induction are collaborative in nature and exceed what individual
group members could learn, generate, understand, or infer
alone (Laughlin and Barth, 1981). The outcome of collective
induction is what has been coined in the literature as group
synergy.
The group synergy framework has been used to describe the
emergence of group rationality as a collective decision-making
competence (Curs¸eu et al., 2013, 2014; Meslec and Curs¸eu,
2013). Groups that achieve weak synergy are those groups that
collectively are more rational than the average rationality of their
individual members, while groups that achieve strong synergy are
those groups that collectively are more rational than their most
rational group member. The concept of group synergy therefore
captures the effectiveness of the collective induction processes, in
that groups that exceed their average or their best member are
those in which the generative learning was most effective.
In a compilational perspective, the group as a whole
develops—through collective induction—new knowledge
structures or competencies that transcend those of their
individual members. Through synergy, groups create new
collaborative zones of proximal development, thus creating
new learning opportunities for all group members. Groups that
achieve weak synergy manage to reach levels of performance that
are higher than the average performance of the group members,
which translates into a new CZPD that moves above the average
performance of the group members and creates higher learning
potential for the average group members but still not for the
best member in the group. When groups achieve strong synergy,
the CZPD moves above the level of the best member in the
group and therefore creates a learning opportunity for all group
members, even for the most rational individual. This notion is
consistent with previous research indicating that individuals who
were part of a successful group performed significantly better in
a subsequent similar task than individuals who were part of an
unsuccessful group (Barron, 2003). Given the reasoning above,
we put forward the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Group synergy fosters the development of
individual decision-making competencies in such a way that
the strength of synergetic processes in groups (reflecting the
effectiveness of collective induction) has a positive influence on
the individual cognitive gain.
Methods
Participants
We sampled 148 students (74 women and 74 men, Mage = 19.1
years) enrolled in an undergraduate course at a Dutch university
(144 participants had no missing data and were included in the
final analyses). Participants were informed that they would take
part in a collaborative learning exercise aimed at illustrating the
relationship between individual and collective decision-making
competencies. The collaborative learning exercise was part of
regular curricular activities in a workshop devoted to decision-
making. We first asked participants to perform a set of decision
tasks individually and then they were asked to do the same
decision tasks in small groups. These groups (38 in total with an
average size of 3.89 members) were previously formed and had a
stable membership throughout the semester, thus our study uses
actual groups composed of members that previously interacted
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in the past and had a foreseeable future together. Verbal consent
was asked before the start of the workshop, and participants were
informed that their results would be used in scientific research
and that they could request their data being excluded from said
research. Because this exercise was part of curricular activities,
no foreseeable risks, beyond those present in regular curricular
activities in higher education, were anticipated in this study.
However, participants were informed that they could contact
the lecturer if they experienced problems with the exercise.
According to the Dutch national ethical guidelines, studies based
on questionnaires that do not require any personal data with the
potential to embarrass the participants, and educational studies
aimed at exploring knowledge or skill acquisition in educational
settings are exempted from ethical committee approval, therefore
no supplementary approval was asked from the local IRB.
Procedure
At the beginning of the workshop, participants were asked to
individually fill out 10 decision tasks, on the basis of which we
evaluated individual rationality at time 1 (IRT1). Then they were
asked to redo the same decision tasks collectively in small groups.
Based on the collective decisions we evaluated group rationality
(GR). Finally, after the group decision-making, the individual
group members were asked to fill out a set of 10 decision tasks
that stemmed from the same task domain but were different from
those used in T1. Based on these tasks we evaluated individual
rationality at time 2 (IRT2). This procedure fits group synergy
research (Larson, 2007; Curs¸eu et al., 2013, 2014; Meslec and
Curs¸eu, 2013) as it allows for computing weak and strong group
synergy. It also aligns well with the procedures used in group-
to-individual transfer of learning research (Schultze et al., 2012).
After completing the second set of decision tasks, we explained
the aim of the exercise to the participants. During the debriefing,
we explained all heuristics and biases used in the decision tasks.
We asked participants to compute their individual and group
scores and we guided them in reflecting on how individual
decision competencies are related to the emergent group decision
competencies.
Instruments
Decision-making competencies at time 1 were evaluated with
a set of 10 decision tasks previously used to evaluate decision
rationality (Curs¸eu and Schruijer, 2012a). The 10 decision-
making tasks were adapted from experimental procedures used to
illustrate various biases in the decision-making literature, namely
the framing effect (2 items), representativeness bias (6 items),
and Ellsberg’s paradox (2 items). The items were formulated as
multiple choice items and the normatively correct alternative
was always presented among the alternatives participants had
to choose from. Individual and group decision competencies
were computed by summing the number of normatively correct
answers (selected by individuals and groups, respectively) and
the resulting score reflects decision rationality defined as the
extent to which individual or group choices are aligned with a
normative ideal. Decision competencies at time 2 were evaluated
using a set of 10 decision tasks that were different but related
to the first 10 decisions. This second set of decision tasks was
created in a similar fashion to the tasks used at time 1 and
had the same distribution of decision tasks: framing effect (2
items), representativeness bias (6 items), and Ellsberg’s paradox
(2 items). The items are presented as Supplementary Material
(Data Sheet 2). Due to the heterogeneity of items used to
evaluate rationality and similar with previously reported data on
these decision tasks (Curs¸eu and Schruijer, 2012a), Cronbach’s
alpha is rather low (0.43 at time 1 and 0.26 at time 2). The
inter-item correlations are presented as Supplementary Material
(Data Sheet 1). In general, one can observe higher inter-item
correlations within rather than between heuristics. Although
reliability is problematic, the construct validity ensured by the
fact that the items are derived from experimental procedures used
to evaluate deviations from rational behavior supports the use of
this approach for assessing decision competence as rationality.
Cognitive gain (CG), one of the dependent variables, was
computed as the difference between individual rationality at time
2 and individual rationality at time 1: CG= IRT2-IRT1.
Group synergy was evaluated by comparing the group
rationality score with the individual rationality scores at time
1. In line with the procedures specified in Larson (2007) and
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998), we made a distinction between
members of: (1) non-synergetic groups (groups in which the
level of collective rationality was lower than the average level of
individual rationality), (2) weak synergy groups (groups in which
the collective level of rationality was higher than the average
level of rationality of their members but lower than the level
of rationality of their most rational member), and (3) strong
synergy groups (groups in which the collective level of rationality
is higher than the level of rationality of their most rational
groupmember). Based on categorizing participants in these three
types of groups, 43 participants (in 13 groups) belong to the
non-synergetic group condition, 76 (in 18 groups) to the weak
synergy condition and 26 participants (in seven groups) to the
strong synergy condition. Because the three conditions reflect an
incremental change in collective induction processes we coded
with zero participants in non-synergetic groups, with one those in
groups with weak synergy and with two the participants in strong
synergy groups.
One’s position in relation to the CZPD was computed on the
basis of the constellation of individual rationality levels in the
group. Specifically, we computed the difference between a focal
participant’s rationality score and the average of the remaining
fellow group members’ individual rationality scores at time 1.
This score does not directly measure the CZPD itself (as it is a
continuous variable), but it is a proxy for one’s relative position
in relation to the average decision competence of the rest of the
group.
As control variables we used age and gender. These variables
were found to be related to decision-making competencies and
interpersonal interaction style in small groups (Curs¸eu and
Schruijer, 2012a; Curs¸eu et al., 2013, 2015).
Randomization Checks
In our study, we used established groups in order to better
capture synergetic processes and their effect on the development
of decision-making competencies (Curs¸eu and Schruijer, 2012b).
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Although students were originally randomly assigned to groups,
we decided to conduct some randomization checks before
running the analyses. We therefore performed an ANOVA with
the group ID as factor and the individual rationality at time 1 as
dependent variable. We found no significant effect, F(37, 106) =
1.49, p = 0.06, showing that the between group variance was not
significantly different from the within group variance. Moreover,
as Levene’s test for equality of error variances was not significant,
F(37, 106) = 1.37, p = 0.10, we can conclude based on these
joint results that participants were sufficiently randomized across
groups in terms of their initial decision competencies.
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlations
for the variables included in our analyses; Table 2 presents the
descriptive statistics for the synergy subgroups.
In order to account for the nested nature of the data
(individuals nested in groups) we performed multilevel analysis.
In addition, to account for gender and age related differences in
decision competencies we controlled for gender and age in our
analyses. Our data have a multilevel structure, with individuals
(Level 1; n = 148) nested within groups (Level 2; n =
38). We therefore used a hierarchical linear modeling (HLM)
framework to perform multilevel analyses (using HLM version
7). HLM takes into account that scores from lower-level units
(individuals) are dependent upon membership within higher-
level units (groups) and allows for estimating effects of variables
at multiple levels of analysis (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992;
Hofmann et al., 2000), thus making it particularly appropriate
for our purposes. In addition to entering these control variables,
we included relative position to CZPD as a Level-1 predictor and
group synergy as a Level-2 predictor to the multilevel equation.
One’s position in relation to the CZPD was operationalized as a
continuous variable and synergy was operationalized using three
categories: no-synergy (0), weak synergy (1), and strong synergy
(2) groups. The results of the HLM analysis are presented in
Table 3.
The effect of one’s position in relation to the CZPD is negative
and significant (B = −0.68, p < 0.001) showing that group
members that were more rational than the rest of the group had a
lower cognitive gain than group members that were less rational
than the rest of the group. Therefore we can conclude that the
first hypothesis was fully supported by the data. Moreover, our
results showed that group synergy had a significant positive effect
on cognitive gain (B = 0.77, p = 0.005). As the effectiveness of
the collective induction processes increases (as illustrated by the
strength of the synergetic group processes) so does the cognitive
gain experienced by the individual group members. Therefore,
the second hypothesis was also fully supported. Additionally, age
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations for the synergy based
subgroups included in the study.
Independent variable Level N Cognitive gain IRT2
Mean SD Mean SD
Group synergy No synergy 43 −0.40 1.99 3.82 1.89
Weak synergy 75 0.55 1.68 4.52 1.61
Strong synergy 26 2.44 2.97 5.67 2.27
SD, standard deviation; CZPD, collaborative zone of proximal development; IRT2,
individual rationality at time 2; Means and standard deviations are reported based on the
ANOVA results with age and gender as controls and for IRT2 also with individual rationality
at time 1 as control variable.
TABLE 3 | HLM results for cognitive gain.
Cognitive gain
B (SE) t (sig)
LEVEL-1 PREDICTORS
Gender −0.40 (0.26) 1.53 (0.12)
Age −0.11 (0.04) −2.64 (0.01)
One’s position in relation to CZPD −0.68 (0.05) −13.64 (< 0.001)
LEVEL-2 PREDICTOR
Group synergy 0.77 (0.25) 2.96 (0.005)
Women are coded as 1, men as 0; for synergy 0 = non-synergic groups, 1 = weak
synergy, 2 = strong synergy; B = unstandardized HLM coefficient. SE, standard error.
A two-level model was tested (individual—group); CZPD, collaborative zone of proximal
development.
TABLE 1 | Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations.
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Gender 0.50 0.50 1
2. Age 19.10 1.96 −0.21* 1
3. IR T1 3.89 1.71 −0.04 0.06 1
4. IR T2 4.47 1.57 −0.04 −0.07 0.28** 1
5. GR 4.84 1.51 0.02 0.14 0.28** 0.46** 1
6. PCZDP 0.10 1.87 −0.08 0.01 0.80** 0.06 0.01 1
7. GrSYN 0.88 0.68 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.24** 0.64* 0.004 1
8. CG 0.59 1.96 −0.01 −0.11 −0.64** 0.55** 0.14 −0.64** 0.26**
IRT1, individual rationality at time 1; IRT2, individual rationality at time 2; GR, group rationality; PCZDP, one’s position in relation to the CZPD; GrSYN, group synergy coded as 0 = no
synergy, 1 = weak synergy, 2 = strong synergy; CG, cognitive gain (computed as IRT2-IRT1); gender is coded with 1 = woman and 0 = man.
**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
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TABLE 4 | HLM results for individual rationality at Time 2.
Individual rationality T2
B (SE) t (sig)
LEVEL-1 PREDICTORS
Gender −0.38 (0.25) −1.52 (0.13)
Age −0.09 (0.04) −2.39 (0.01)
Individual rationality T1 0.61 (0.12) 4.88 (<0.001)
One’s position in relation to CZPD −0.40 (0.10) −3.95 (<0.001)
LEVEL-2 PREDICTOR
Group synergy 0.70 (0.25) 2.78 (0.008)
Women are coded as 1, men as 0; for synergy 0 = non-synergic groups, 1 = weak
synergy, 2 = strong synergy; B = unstandardized HLM coefficient. SE, standard error.
A two-level model was tested (individual—group); CZPD, collaborative zone of proximal
development.
had a significant negative effect on cognitive gain (B = −0.11,
p = 0.01), while the effect of gender was not significant.
We performed a supplementary multilevel analysis in order
to assess the robustness of our findings and to address the issues
of endogeneity inherent to our measures. Measures for group
synergy, one’s position in relation to the CZPD and cognitive
gain were all partially derived from individual rationality scores
at time 1, implying that our previous results may suffer from
an endogeneity bias. We therefore set out to test the impact of
group synergy and one’s position in relation to the CZPD on
individual rationality at time 2. The results of the HLM analysis
with individual rationality at time 2 as dependent variable are
presented in Table 4.
The second set of results was consistent with the previous
one using the cognitive gain as dependent variable. Individual
rationality at time 2 was negatively and significantly predicted
by relative position to CZPD (B = −0.4, p < 0.01) and
positively and significantly predicted by group synergy (B = 0.7,
p < 0.01). With respect to the control variables, individual
rationality at time 1 positively predicted individual rationality
at time 2 (B = 0.61, p < 0.01), while age had a significant
negative effect on individual rationality at time 2 (B = −0.09,
p < 0.05). The influence of gender was not statistically significant
(B = −0.38, p > 0.05). To conclude, the results with individual
rationality at time 2 as dependent variable fully replicated the
original results using cognitive gain. Therefore we can conclude
that our results are robust and both hypotheses are supported by
the data.
Finally, following a suggestion made by one of the reviewers,
we have performed another robustness check, by using a
testing procedure reported in Willis et al. (2010) and predicted
individual rationality at time 2 using just individual rationality
at time 1 and group rationality as predictors (we controlled
for age and gender as well). Although this statistical analysis
does not address directly our two hypotheses, it allows us to
compare the model fit for the simple model (procedure reported
in Willis et al., 2010) and the model we reported in Table 4.
In order to obtain the scores for the Akaike’s Information
Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz’s Bayesian Criterion (BIS) we
have run these additional analyses using the mixed models
procedure in SPSS. For the model reported in Table 4, AIC
= 500.51 and BIC = 506.35. For the simplified model, with
individual rationality at time 2 predicted by rationality at time
1 and the group score, we have two positive effects: B = 0.45
(SE = 0.09, t = 4.63, p < 0.001) for group rationality
and B = 0.11 (SE = 0.06, t = 1.68, p = 0.09) for
the influence of individual rationality at time 1 and for this
model the AIC = 499.48 and BIC = 505.38. The comparison
between the two models reveals rather small differences in the
AIC and BIC and the simpler model reveals a strong and
significant effect of group rationality on individual rationality
evaluated at time 2, supporting our general findings related to
the collective induction effects on the development of decision
competencies.
Discussion
Previous research extensively addressed the group-to-individual
transfer of learning and documented the superiority of groups
as compared to individuals in decision-making tasks (Moshman
and Geil, 1998; Schultze et al., 2012; Curs¸eu et al., 2013;
Maciejovsky et al., 2013; Hinsz, 2015).
Thus far, research used collective induction processes to
explain such superiority. Surprisingly, no study addressed this
claim explicitly hampering scientific progress in this field.
In the present study we used two sets of decision tasks
adapted from the heuristics and biases literature to assess both
individual and collective decision competencies. Building on
the group synergy literature (Larson, 2007, 2010; Curs¸eu et al.,
2013; Meslec and Curs¸eu, 2013), we argued that especially
strong cognitive synergy is an accurate indicator of collective
induction and we then tested the influence of group synergy
on the development of individual decision competencies. Our
results show that members of synergetic groups develop their
decision competencies through group interaction processes and
members of strong synergy groups obtain the highest cognitive
benefits.
Next to the alleged collective benefits of cognitive synergy
in groups (Larson, 2010), synergetic groups also influence
the cognitive skills of their members. Synergy however, and
in particular strong cognitive synergy is not easy to achieve
Larson, 2007; Curs¸eu et al., 2013, 2014; Meslec and Curs¸eu,
2013. Several studies manipulated decision rules in order to
test the effect of different patterns of interpersonal interactions
on the emergence of strong synergy in groups (Curs¸eu et al.,
2013; Meslec et al., 2014). However, although some decision
rules (e.g., a collaborative decision rule) seem to be superior
in generating strong cognitive synergy, on average groups did
not outperform their worthiest member. Therefore, looking
at the empirical evidence to date, strong cognitive synergy
is elusive and more research is needed to further identify
and explore the factors that could generate strong synergy in
groups.
A second important insight of this study refers to the effect
of one’s relative position in the CZPD on cognitive gains.
As hypothesized, our results show that the group members
that are situated below or within the CZPD are more prone
to learn from the rest of the group. However, the group
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1375
Curs¸eu et al. Group-to-individual transfer of decision-making competencies
members that are more rational than the rest of the group
could potentially learn only in groups with strong group
synergy. This insight points toward the need for generating a
novel CZPD through collective induction; in synergetic groups
the CZPD is expanded in a way that also benefits the best
performing individuals in the group. Future research should
explore in a more systematic manner the interplay between the
compositional and compilational processes in the transfer of
decision-making competencies. More specifically, it is important
that future studies find ways to directly induce group synergy
and manipulate one’s relative position to CZPD in order to
further test the effect of the interplay between compilational and
compositional processes on the group to individual transfer of
decision-making competencies.
On average, individuals that belong to non-synergetic groups
experience a cognitive decline, that is, group interaction
processes decrease the decision competencies of their members.
These results open important venues for further research.
In particular it is important to understand the processes
through which non-synergetic groups decrease the decision
competencies of their most rational members. We advance
here a few plausible explanations for these findings. First,
dominant members with low decision competencies could
have exerted substantial influence and changed the opinions
of the other group members (minority domination effect).
Second, by discussing inaccurate evaluations of the decision
situations, shared by the majority of the group members,
the most rational group members could have been misled
in their subsequent decisions (majority domination effects).
Moreover, the compromise-seeking tendency in group debates
that is specific to the Dutch context (Lijphart, 1975) could
partially account for the cognitive decline recorded for highly
rational participants in non-synergetic groups. Unfortunately,
we do not have process data that could have help us test
these alternative explanations. Yet, future research could further
address these potential explanations. To conclude, our study
provides initial empirical evidence concerning the factors that
influence the transfer of decision-making competencies from
groups to individuals.
Limitations
Next to its contributions, the present study has some limitations
as well. First, we did not record the group discussions, therefore
we have no data on the communication and social influence
processes unfolding in groups. Second, we have used only a small
selection of decision situations from the literature on decision
heuristics and biases. Future research could extend the variety of
tasks used and attempt to document whether the cognitive gains
attributable to cognitive synergy vary across various decision-
making tasks and the degree to which these changes are stable
in time. Even so, as we selected some of the most common
situations in which biases and heuristics are prone to arise,
this small set of decision tasks is indicative for the challenges
decision-makers (individual and group) face. Third, we have
not directly manipulated group synergy nor CZPD (they are
observed variables) therefore the causal claims should be treated
with caution. Fourth, given the nature of the decision tasks,
our results are susceptible to a ceiling effect (individuals with
the maximum score at T1 cannot experience a cognitive gain
at T2), however, in the whole sample only one participant had
the maximum score at T1 and none had the maximum score
at T2. Therefore, we can conclude that the ceiling effect is not
a likely bias for our results. Fifth, the convenience sampling
method and the student population could indicate a selection
bias and limit the generalizability of our findings. Future research
could attempt to replicate these findings in different samples and
address this selection bias. Moreover, specific training in statistics
and probability judgment undergone by students could increase
the likelihood of success in the 10 decision tasks. However,
given that the students in our study were first-year students this
seems to be less of a concern than it would have been, had we
included later cohorts. Finally, the regression toward the mean
could be an alternative explanation for our results concerning
the development of the individual decision competencies. In
other words, extremely high scores for individual rationality
at time 1 could converge toward less extreme scores at time
2. In order to explore this alternative explanation, we have
used a repeated measure ANOVA to test the change in the
within group SD from time 1 to time 2 using group size as a
control (to account for the covariance between group size and
within group SD). The results reveal that although the average
within group SD is lower at T2 (M = 1.05, SD = 0.50) as
compared to T1 (M = 1.42, SD = 0.68), the difference is not
statistically significant F(1, 36) = 0.67 (0.41). This result however
cannot fully refute the regression toward the mean alternative
explanation.
Practical Implications
Because groups are often required to make important
organizational and societal decisions, it is important to
understand their impact on the development of individual
decision competencies. The use of groups to make important
organizational decisions is especially important due to the
group superiority effect (in general groups are more rational
than the average rationality of their members) (Hinsz, 2015).
However, next to the benefits attributable to higher decision
quality in groups, our results show that (synergetic) groups
are a valuable training ground for individual decision-makers.
Our findings show that G-I transfer of learning is influenced
by compositional as well as compilational factors. In other
words, group members learn from each other as well as from
the group as a whole. Special attention should be paid to the
quality of interpersonal interactions in groups. Highly rational
group members seem to suffer from being part of non-synergetic
groups. Moreover, the potential learning they could generate
for the group as a whole and for the less rational individuals
in particular, is not achieved. Thus, in order to optimize the
learning effect, when strong cognitive synergy is not achieved,
groups will need tools to identify and improve the performance
of their most rational group members. The identification
of the most knowledgeable group members (in a particular
decision domain) could be facilitated through the use of specific
decision rules (Meslec et al., 2014) or the use of decision support
systems.
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